Dev Raj Dahal and Hari Uprety

A yearning for decentralization gives one the impression of an willingness to enter into a discourse on already existing concepts and policies rather than a readiness to innovate. And, here are two books that contain an elaborate review of the legislative and institutional innovations about decentralization in Nepal under various regimes, appraise its implementation aspect, highlight the impediments and expect to enable the concerned authorities and policy makers to apply the lessons learned.

Shrestha's book analyses the current Local Governance Act 1999, and counsels the powers that be to fulfill three essential preconditions for decentralization: attitude change of central political and bureaucratic authorities in favor of local governance and development, build confidence on local government institutions (LGIs) and entrench their capacity-building for effective delivery of public goods and services to the people.

Agrawal and his colleagues conclude with similar points what they call "three pillars" but they largely focus on Participatory District Development. Program (PDDP) undertaken by the UNDP in cooperation with the Nepalese government. There are a number of visions of decentralization competing with one another. They are ideologically grounded on the perception of different systems and actors. Panchayati decentralization (1962-1990), for example, had set a number of less attainable goals. But the spirit of bureaucrats smacked of "empire-building," without any reference to ends, popular values and downward accountability. The monocratic nature of the polity was no less a hindrance as responsibilities were devoid of power and authority.

The multi-party dispensation, meanwhile, has unlocked a number of aspirations providing a real possibility for devolution through territorial restructuring, delegation of administrative power, economic and political devolution. setting up of user's committees, empowerment of the niarginalized, capacity building of NGOs and civil society, strengthening local institutions, conflict resolution mechanism, etc. These aspirations reflect the segmented character of Nepalese society in which the power elite are motivated towards increasing centralization of power and wealth. Obviously, adoption of a single path of evolution is not enough to address local diversities and the problems of social integration. For example, patrimonialism during the Rana regime (1846-1950), nationalization under the multi party dispensation (1950-1960), statism of the Panchayat system and the primacy of market materialism (1990 to now) of today have all proved to be deficient. The golden mean for Nepalese politics rests on avoiding the Left politics of too much entitlement and the Center and Right politics of social neglect. There is indeed a need for a new social contract which combines the principles of social justice with economic efficiency and market allocation.

Shrestha's motivation to pedal with only "devolution and de-concentration" brands of decentralization is surprising. Such an account de-couples the discourse from the broader macroeconomic horizontal policies, such as privatization, deregulation, denationalization. etc. that have been vigorously pursued and executed in the context of the neo-liberal consensus of the post-1991 governments. The ideology of consensus was capable of revoking the public ownership of the commanding height of the economy, disembodying the economy from the state and society, coalescing private ownership of the means of production with the market and relying mainly on urban reforms, thereby wounding deeply the agrarian life-world -- the target of devolution.

Agrawal and his colleagues, on the other hand, do see privatization's role in the decentralization context. But the way the term crops up- while defining the terms associated with decentralization- leaves a lot of doubt about its use though. Suspicion creeps into the reader that the authors may be trying to equate erosion of central control with decentralization. Although, for a broader decentralization to work, central control has to be loosened in many instances, it would defeat the purpose of a weak state if it transfers that control to any other sector, apart from local governance institutions. Privatization does have a bearing in loosening central control over public resources, but it is in no way connected with devolving power to the local authorities. Loss of central control is not decentralization. A lot of' good would have been achieved, however, if the impact of an increased private sector role in governance were assessed by the authors.

At quite another level, the possession of even a small amount of assets can enable villagers to overcome market failures, reduce uncertainties and make rational calculation possible. It is the experiences of villagers in decentralized governance often in relations to the use of resources, such as forests and irrigation, believe Agrawal and his colleagues, that have made decentralization policies more meaningful.
It would be ingenuous to envision devolution without developing social control over the forces of production, expanding the productive capacities of a majority of the impoverished people, developing their organizational and leadership base and evolving an auto-centric political construction based on self-management of their own affairs.

This means the state should also constitute a space for people's participation in national decision-making and assume to play a central role as regulator and promoter of social justice by means of a new kind of collective action- conducive for institutional innovation and for proper policy measures. Yet., the nature of "social relations" in rural areas and their weight in determining political and economic power must not be downplayed in addressing both policy context and policy targets. The authors, however, fall short of distinguishing between the trajectory of decentralization logic and the problems of development dynamics of traditional culture that undervalued local capital accumulation and enterpreneurship which have been hampering people's participation in any socio-economic transformation. One example is the emigration of Nepal's technical manpower, those we call Dalits, to several Indian cities in search of jobs thus leaving the rural areas in stagnation and sterile. Genuine decentralization, therefore, has to take into account nation-building as the primary task while at the same time sustaining open and competitive politics, checks and balances and a civic culture.

In a situation of social irrationality and economic inequality, efforts to transform social institutions and modify property rights are central to guarantee everyone the material basis for a good life. Unless the poor are organized to play a political role, the local elite will continue to capture grassroots institutions leaving the poor seriously vulnerable to an odious sort of identity politics, economic stagnation and inequity. The main answers, therefore, lie in breaking the rulers' impunity, abuse and corruption while making political power more dispersed, government more efficient and accountable. The erosion of feudal power has given way to an associated network of loyalties and dependencies through political parties, interest groups and the institutions of civil society and helped in sustaining the status quo.

Mobilization of local resources and credits are woefully inadequate both to trigger development initiatives and achieve sustainable livelihoods. An acute lack of requisite technical personnel and financial resources in the majority of VDCs, municipalities and DDCs, especially those of the mountains and hills, makes intervention of central government, donor community and NGOs, a necessary evil.

Paradoxically, however, external intervention decays the public ownership over policy and weakens the popular stake in the development and governance process, thereby deeming the whole exercise largely unsustainable. The central political process decides on major policies regarding the rationality of planning on environment, education, gender, employment, health and addressing the problems of the weak and the marginalized. Only those economic policies that guarantee a preservation of the environment can link themselves to the struggle against poverty.

It is in this context that the political process needs to be decentralized as a pre-requisite to the decentralization of the governance institutions. In other words, political parties themselves need to decentralize first, otherwise all powers would be ultimately tend to centralize on the political leadership through the political process, no matter how well the governance institutions are decentralized. And, a partial decentralization would only skew the balance of power and make national priorities go astray. Delegation of planning experts who are impervious to the contextual content of popular aspirations and needs continues to emasculate the consultative process. Therefore, it is the Federations of local authorities that continue to articulate their concerns on many areas

Currently, decentralization schemes are suffering from both policy suffocation, because of some of donors' increased interest in governance and tendency to create counter and parallel structures at the local level, and a weakening of political autonomy of elected representatives rendering them incapable of protecting politics as a public sphere. This is why Agraival and his colleagues argue 'for the need to harness indigenous knowledge for a sustainable and participatory development.' Decentralization is not possible without basic social changes. The monopolist and feudal control must break up because it makes the capital city a spider's web- the further away one goes from Kathmandu, the more powerless one becomes. The Nepali society's deficit is, therefore, largely political and moral, as authorities prefer to go beyond their responsibilities and exercise power disproportionate to their representativeness thus weakening a wider role for local governance, notwithstanding some measures towards increased devolution of economic power and increased women's participation.


The indigenous peoples and the ethnic, social and culturally distinct groups require suitable forms of political representation and economic foundation. The problem manifests itself even at the central level, even without decentralization. Therefore, if it is not addressed by the decentralization framework, the central weaknesses could easily percolate to the grassroots. This is why addressing sectoral growth needs and allocating surplus labor in growth areas remain largely unmet. An alternative development strategy must focus on building the industrial network for the development of a national project to strengthen the inter-sectoral and inter-regional balance. Reconciliation of classes can only occur if small-scale and intermediary private and public industries facilitate the economic participation of people and strengthen the country's creative capacity for production, distribution and financing.

Encouraged by the rationalist policy discourse sweeping the globe and themselves feeling powerless to encounter its implications, Nepali planners and politicians have not been able to accept a decentralized political community legitimized by the social contract. And, underneath this process lies the denial of substantive democracy for the majority of impoverished people who are powerless to legislate any change. This is igniting the exclusionary aspirations across the fault lines of the state which both the books fail to indicate.

Is it only the citizens' rights to participate that must be limited to constitutional bounds when economic, technological, ecological and other policies are internationalized? How can people be allowed to exercise their sovereign power in such a situation? The existence of regional disparity, economic feudalism, an encrusted tradition of caste/gender stereotyping and an elite web of power permeate the patrimonial dependency. This stands in the way of social dialectics and the art of governance. In practice, in many cases, local party chiefs control the representative institutions and steer the channel of interest articulation and communication.

The half a million-rupee constituency development fund allocated to each MP fuses the legislative and executive functions of development and props up the traditional patronage politics. LGI federations maintain that the roles and responsibilities of the Local Development Officer, the Chief District Officer and the District Police Chief are less attuned to the cohesive spirit of local self-governance. The act is also silent on the administrative powers of VDCs and DDCs.

An arc of continuity of the legacy of Panchayati decentralization drive, as Shrestha claims, "continued to exist till the enactment of Local Governance Act 1998," debunking time balance-sheet of executing decentralization "more in favor of its weakness and failures rather than strengths and successes." The post-Panchayati dispensation had caught the Panchayati flu, because it incorporated into its administrative-economic system the political culture of the ancien regime. As a result, people are now experiencing a nasty deflationary spiral in governance. Repayment of foreign debt continues to exacerbate destitution and keep out investments necessary for economic growth, technological progress, ecological preservation and social justice.

Nepal is not capable of perpetually acting on time exigencies of development prescriptions. And, such prescriptions barely promote political choice of time people. One can see the Nepali state and international community presenting quite different conditions regarding the promotion of the local people's interest. Evidently, national construction is subjected to time external political will (conditionalities), economic necessity (aid, trade and technological dependence) and ideological arbitrariness (neo-liberalism), leaving little democratic space for time people to organize a better life under decentralization. The loss of autonomy of the state has opened the space for populism and ideological irrationalities. Yet, both time books forego these fundamental points to confront with reason. The laxity in the performance of coordination communities at time district level and the functioning of Decentralization Implementation and Follow-up Committees at the central level reflects the endogenous problems- lack of a system of transparency and accountability.

In their systematic fashion, the authors continue to identify conditions vital to the successful implementation of decentralization, show how they can be fostered and uncover the relationship between ideals of decentralization and interests of various regimes in implementation. Shrestha uses the current fad, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, while Agrawal and his colleagues focus on the comparative perspective, especially drawing the lessons from China, Kenya, Tanzania, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Peru and Ivory Coast. Both boos should prove to be a valuable addition to any decentralization student's collection.

Tulsi Narayan Shrestha, The Implementation of Decentralization Scheme in Nepal: An Assessment and Lessons for Future, (Kathmandu: Joshi Publications, 1999), pp. 175, Price 500.

Arun Agrawal, Charla Britt and Kcshav Kanel, Decentralization in Nepal: A Comparative Analysis, California: International Center for Self-Governance, 1999), pp. 95.

Published in The Rising Nepal, October 1, 1999